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Abstract

This research provides a means of automating the process to reverse engineer an automobile’s CAN Bus to
quickly recover CAN IDs and message values to control the various systems in a modern automobile. This
approach involved the development of a Python script that uses several open-source tools to interact with the
CAN Bus, and it takes advantage of several vulnerabilities associated with the CAN protocol. These
vulnerabilities allow the script to conduct replay attacks against the CAN Bus and affect various systems in an
automobile without the operator’s knowledge or interaction.
These replay attacks can be accomplished by capturing recorded network traffic and resending them to find
which traffic conducts certain actions. Automobiles are becoming more reliant on computer systems and
networks to operate, including the integration of wireless interfaces to interact with these systems
(Avatefipour & Malik, 2018). These systems contain numerous vulnerabilities as they were not built with
consideration to hacking (Wolf, Weimerskirch, & Paar, 2004). Creating a tool to automate the reverse
engineering process allows for a better understanding of the CAN Bus and its vulnerabilities. The aim of this
script is to allow the user to identify what specific packets captured from CAN Bus traffic will initiate selected
actions in the automobile’s controls. The results show the user can repeatedly split and send log files to the
CAN Bus to narrow down the files to a single packet that is starting the selected outputs of the CAN Bus using
this script.
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INTRODUCTION
Computer systems are becoming increasingly integrated into modern cars to
improve their performance and safety. This results in an increasing scale and
complexity of the systems supporting these automobiles. Modern cars are currently
built upon several millions of lines of code in their software to run these systems
(Charette, 2009). Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are used to monitor sensors and
to control components of an automobile such as turn signals, doors, and the speed
of the car (Charette, 2009).
While modern cars have been greatly benefited by these advancements, these
systems are vulnerable to malicious attacks, because there have been few
safeguards added to prevent them from occurring (Wolf, Weimerskirch, & Paar,
2004). The vulnerabilities of the CAN bus include the lack of any encryption,
allowing the attacker to view these packets in plaintext, thus allowing attackers to
capture packets from the CAN bus to send back later (Pan, Zheng, Chen, Luan,
Bootwala, & Batten, 2017). Another serious vulnerability is the lack of
authentication inside the network, because without authentication an attacker can
conduct repay attacks without having to appear as a legitimate source (Wolf,
Weimerskirch, & Paar, 2004). This lack of encryption and authentication permits
even an attacker with no prior knowledge of the particular automobile’s controls to
reverse-engineer the CAN bus to determine message IDs and data values to
interfere with virtually any system connected to that vehicle’s CAN bus.
Significant prior work has been published on hacking particular vehicles, from a
2011 Chevy Malibu (Checkoway et al., 2011) to the 2015 Jeep Cherokee (Miller &
Valasek, 2018) to 2016 Tesla and 2018 BMW hacks (Payne, 2019). However, in
each case, a researcher must do extensive investigative work hands-on with each
vehicle, manually reverse-engineering each CAN bus ID and message value for the
various controls of each system in the vehicle. And CAN IDs and data values vary
not only across manufacturers, but between models from the same manufacturer,
and even between the same model across different model years. The purpose of this
paper is to provide an easy-to-use application capable of automating much of the
process, assisting the researcher in quickly discovering and documenting CAN IDs
and data values for relevant control systems in any automobile to which the
researcher has physical access.
Besides a direct physical connection to the on-board diagnostic type two (OBD-II)
port, wireless connections can be made to modern vehicles by using external
interfaces such as Bluetooth, 4G LTE, and GPS (Avatefipour & Malik, 2018). This
makes the vulnerabilities of the CAN bus more problematic, as it expands the
possible methods attackers can use to access the car's CAN bus (Avatefipour &
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Malik, 2018). The Python script developed in this paper exploits these
vulnerabilities to allow a researcher, or an attacker, to reverse engineer the CAN
bus inside the majority of automobiles sold in the US in the past twenty years.

SETTING UP THE ENVIRONMENT
The process begins with connecting to the car using an OBD-II converter, such as
a $40 CANtact CAN to USB converter, or a slightly more expensive $70 Korlan
USB2CAN adapter like the one shown in Figure 1 (Kirby, 2019).

Figure 1: The Korlan USB2CAN adapter ($70 USD) connects a laptop or desktop
computer to the OBD-II port in most cars and trucks sold in the US since 1996.

VirtualBox or VMware can be used to create a Kali or Ubuntu Linux virtual
machine in order to create an environment suitable for intercepting and replaying
CAN traffic (Payne, 2019). Once a Linux VM is installed, the proper tools needs to
be installed so the script can be run. Fortunately, the user only needs to install canutils. Can-utils is an open-source Linux tool that allows the user to interact with the
CAN bus by issuing commands on the terminal. This allows the user to interact
with the CAN bus by sending individual packets, sending entire log files, and
display CAN bus traffic. Can-utils can be installed with the following terminal
command:
sudo apt-get install can-utils

Next, the user needs to use an OBD-II Adapter cable, a CANtact v1.0 CAN to USB
Converter, and A-Male to B-Male USB 2.0 cable to hook up to the car. The OBDII Adapter is plugged into the OBD-II port of the vehicle. The OBD-II port is
commonly located beside or below the steering wheel. In order to use the CANtact
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2019/research/5
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or Korlan converter to look at the car's CAN bus traffic, the slcand daemon needs
to run and a CAN interface should be enabled using the following commands:
sudo modprobe can
sudo slcand /dev/ttyACM0 can 0
sudo ip link set up can0 type can bitrate 500000

Issuing a candump command like the one below helps capture all traffic in the CAN
bus and inserts it into a log file for the user to use in the script:
candump -L can0 > action.log

It is important to note that the candump command must be issued before doing
anything in the car that the user wishes to record to the log file, otherwise the actions
will not be captured. More than one action can be performed in a single candump.
For example, the user can turn on the headlights, use both turn signals, turn on the
radio and air conditioning, press the brake pedal, and rev the engine during a single
logging session. The same log file can then be replayed to determine the CAN
message IDs and data values for each of the controls captured, one at a time. The
user can press CTRL-C to stop the capture.
In many cases, a control will remain active after it is initiated (like turning on the
headlights or radio), so a second short candump capture is required to serve as a
“baseline” to reset the control to its off state:
candump -L can0 > baseline.log

After issuing this command, the user can turn off the relevant controls—including
turning off more than one system at a time. This baseline file will be replayed after
each successful replay of the first log file to turn off the appropriate controls for
each successive round of refinement. (Again, press CTRL-C to stop the capture.)

IMPLEMENTATION
A Python script is used to automate the reverse engineering process by sending
repeated replay attacks using a binary search to replay recursively smaller halves
of the log file until only a single CAN bus message remains. Python is used because
it was faster and more flexible to design the script with and the requirements do not
demand the fast execution of compiled languages.
The script only needs the user to provide two log files: the log file containing
captured traffic with the original output and a log file to toggle off any functions
turned on by the previous log file. The syntax to run the script is:
python

CANReverseEngineer.py

action.log

baseline.log

where action.log is the log file containing the actions the user wishes to reversePublished by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2019
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engineer into CAN IDs and message values, and baseline.log is the log file
containing a clear (off) signal for the same control.
The script uses a straightforward binary search approach, cutting the log file into
halves and playing these halves for the user across the CAN bus cable to the vehicle,
or to the emulator if preferred. After a half is played, the user decides if the file sent
the output the user is looking for (like brake lights, radio turned on, turn signals,
etc.). If the desired control is activated, that file’s half is split into smaller halves
and those halves are played until there is only one line remaining, containing the
command that generates the desired output.
If the first half is played with no desired output the user can play the second half to
find if the desired output is in the second half instead. If the user finds the desired
output from the car, the half that was played is set as the file to be split again at the
start of the while loop, the number of lines is updated for the new half-file, and the
file counter is incremented to match the number of times the file was split. But, if
at any point both halves are played and no desired response is found, the script will
stop, requiring the researcher to start from the original file, or possibly recapture
the CAN bus data from the source.
Once a log file with only one line is generated, the while loop stops, and the script
returns the name of the log file that contains the packet the user is looking for. The
user can check the final log file to see the packet that triggers the desired output,
and they can check if it really gives this desired output by sending the following
command:
cansend [packet from final log file]

A binary search method to split the files into halves and run those halves was used
for this script. The script checks for an even number of lines before splitting in half.
If the number of lines in the log file is not even, the middle of the file is pushed to
one more line before spitting. A variable that increments after each cycle through
the while loop is used to keep track of how many times the file has been split and
is used as part of the naming convention for newly split log files. The naming
convention goes x followed by the number of files played followed by aa if it’s the
first half or ab if it is the second half. For example, file “x1aa” would be from the
first time a file was split and is the original file’s first half. The code below
demonstrates how the files are split:
if (numberOfLines % 2 == 0):
os.system("split -l %i %s x%i" % (findMiddleOfFile(file), file,
fileCounter))
firstHalf = "x%iaa" % fileCounter
secondHalf = "x%iab" % fileCounter

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2019/research/5
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elif (numberOfLines % 2 == 1):
os.system("split -l %i %s x%i" %
(findMiddleOfFile(file)+1, file, fileCounter))
firstHalf = "x%iaa" % fileCounter
secondHalf = "x%iab" % fileCounter

A line of code is presented below showing the terminal command to replay a log
file across the CAN bus.
canplayer -I [file name]

The current implementation inside the Python script wraps this terminal command
in a Python os.system() command that sends this command automatically through
the Linux terminal without user interaction (Kirby, 2019).
Any function of the car that toggles on and off requires the function to be turned
off before commands to turn on the feature can be used again, so a file of captured
traffic containing packets to turn off the turn signals is used as well. The command
to play the log file is placed inside of a for loop to repeat the command multiple
times. The current implementation is seen in the code below:
for x in range(0, 5):
os.system("canplayer -I %s" % firstHalf)
os.system("canplayer -I %s" % baseline)

The final resulting line of a CAN log file after several rounds of halving the file
and indicating “Y” or “n” should look like the one below. The featured CAN
message shown here is the command used to turn on the right side turn signal inside
a simulated CAN network:
vcan0 188#02000000

Finding the packets that trigger the acceleration and deceleration in a CAN bus can
be more difficult, as they do not represent a simple toggle on and off like turn
signals (Payne, 2019). This means the response will be harder to see by the user as
the responses will mean smaller upward movements from the speedometer. Finding
harder to detect desired outputs can be done with a for loop as it replays the output
multiple times, so it gives the user multiple chances to detect the output (Kirby,
2019). To take full advantage of this script, it is recommended that the user create
a database to hold CAN bus data of reverse-engineered cars to use at a later time.

RESULTS
The resulting seventy-line Python script can successfully reverse engineer many of
the functions controlled by an automobile’s CAN bus. The user interaction required

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2019

5

KSU Proceedings on Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice, Event 5 [2019]

is limited to capturing the original CAN bus log with the desired controls activated
and a “baseline” log with all controls turned off, then selecting “Y” or “n” to
indicate whether the automated analysis script was able to activate the control
during the replay phase. Using a binary search approach to split the files is fast.
However, the speed that the script can narrow down the log files to one line varies
by the log (base 2) of the number of lines in the capture file.
Another factor to consider is user error. If the user misses any input coming from
the CAN bus, the user needs to delete all the files generated by the script and restart
with the original log file. Many functions were easy to discover with the script
including functions that toggled on and off such as the turn signals, door locks, and
so on (Kirby, 2019). We have begun testing on a range of production automobiles
to amass a database of CAN IDs and message values for future work, and
successfully captured control signals in three of four vehicles tested (a 2006
Volkswagen Jetta failed to connect successfully to the laptop). The user can
successfully discover which arbitration ID belongs to a particular control along with
the data field values that can be manipulated to send different commands.

SOURCE CODE
from subprocess import check _output
import os, sys

"""
--CANReverseEngineer.py--:
Reverse engineers CAN bus systems
to find a specific CAN bus ID and
message values corresponding to a
particular automitive control msg
by automating replay attacks.
"""

# Global Variables
# if arguments provided at command line, set log and baseline files
if len(sys.argv) > 2:
log = sys.argv[1]
baseline = sys.argv[2]
else:

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2019/research/5
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print("Usage: python CANReverseEngineer.py {logfilename}
{baselinefilename}")
print("------------------------------------------------------------------")
print("
messages,")

Where {logfilename} is a candump of the desired CAN

print("
turned off.")

and {baselinefilename} is candump of all controls

def countNumberOfLines(file):
return int(check_output(["wc", "-l", file]).split()[0])

def findMiddleOfFile(file):
return int(countNumberOfLines(file)/2)

#Sends automated replay attack against CAN bus
def sendReplayAttack(file):

numberOfLines = countNumberOfLines(file)
fileCounter = 1
correctOutput = True

while(numberOfLines > 1):
#Splits files
if(numberOfLines % 2 == 0):
os.system("split -l %i %s x%i" %
(findMiddleOfFile(file),file,fileCounter))
firstHalf = "x%iaa" % fileCounter
secondHalf = "x%iab" % fileCounter
elif(numberOfLines % 2 == 1):
os.system("split -l %i %s x%i" %
(findMiddleOfFile(file)+1,file,fileCounter))
firstHalf = "x%iaa" % fileCounter
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secondHalf = "x%iab" % fileCounter

print("[*]Playing first half of %s" % file)
for x in range(0, 5):
os.system("canplayer -I %s" % firstHalf)
os.system("canplayer -I %s" % baseline)

answer1 = input("[*]Did the first half %s send correct output?
[Y/n]?" % file)

if(answer1 == "Y"):
file = firstHalf
numberOfLines = countNumberOfLines(file)
fileCounter+=1
elif(answer1 == "n"):
print("[*]Sending second half of %s" % file)
for y in range(0, 5):
os.system("canplayer -I x%iab" % fileCounter)
os.system("canplayer -I %s" % baseline)

answer2 = input("[*]Did the second half of %s send the
correct output?? [Y/n]?" % file)

if(answer2 == "Y"):
file = secondHalf
fileLength = countNumberOfLines(file)
fileCounter+=1
elif(answer2 == "n"):
print("[*]Desired output is not in file.")
correctOutput = False
break

if(correctOutput == True):

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2019/research/5
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print("[*]%s contains correct output" % file)

#Executes script
sendReplayAttack(log)
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